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THE I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) CONTROVERSY:
SHOULD EVENTS AFTER DEATH AFFECT THE
VALUE OF ESTATE TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE?
Anna Meresidis*
INTRODUCTION

Jill Smith dies leaving an estate worth $2,000,000. Prior to her
death, Ms. Smith owed $400,000 to a third party. She died without
having paid any portion of the debt. Under local law, therefore, Ms.
Smith's estate owes $400,000 to the third party. For federal estate tax
purposes, Ms. Smith's estate deducts the $400,000 as a claim against
the estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3).1 A few months after Ms.
Smith's death, her estate settles the debt to the third party for
$200,000, i.e., half of the amount she owed on the date of her death
(and thus only half of what was claimed as a deduction for estate tax
purposes).
Under current case law in some United States jurisdictions, events
that occurred after Ms. Smith's death, i.e., the settlement of the debt
for less than what was owed at the time of her death, are irrelevant
and the decedent's taxable estate would be reduced by the $400,000
she owed at the time of her death, even though there was an
additional $200,000 transfer to her beneficiaries.2 These jurisdictions
follow the date-of-death valuation rule, where the deduction for
claims against the estate are based only on the value of those claims at
the date of the decedent's death.' In other jurisdictions, events
occurring subsequent to the decedent's death (the settlement) are
relevant and may be used to calculate the estate tax. In these
jurisdictions, the deduction for the claim against the estate existing at
* J.D. Candidate 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Donald Sharpe for his invaluable assistance with this Note. I would also

like to thank my mother Vaso, my father Chris, and my brother George for their
constant love and support.
1. All statutes referred to in this Note are statutes from the 2001 Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
2. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of possible tax consequences of this act to
the decedent's beneficiaries.

3. See infra note 23.
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the date of death would be limited to the $200,000 actually paid by the
estate.4

Recent cases have reinvigorated the issue of when to value claims
against the estate. Two circuits have decided this issue as a case of
first impression in the last year,5 deciding that claims against the estate
should be valued at the date of the decedent's death.6 Although
earlier cases stated that post-death events should be considered in
valuing claims against the estate, 7 these more recent cases challenge

the wisdom of the earlier rulings.'
This Note discusses the controversy between valuing deductions for
estate tax purposes as of the date of the decedent's death and valuing
deductions based on events that occur after the decedent has died.9

The Note describes the different types of claims a creditor can have
against the estate, 10 events that may change the value of the claim,"

and the debate on whether the change in the value of the claim after
the decedent's death should likewise change the amount of the
deduction."2 This Note argues that claims against the estate should be
valued for federal estate tax purposes at the date of the decedent's
death based on facts known up to, but not after, that date. 3

Part I provides an overview of § 2053(a)(3) and other relevant
provisions. Part L.A gives a brief history and background of
deductions for claims against the estate.'4 Part LB describes the five
different types of claims against a decedent's estate that a creditor

may have and the question of how to value those claims. 5 Part I.C
discusses possible tax consequences of a claim being settled or
compromised for less than the amount claimed as a deduction. 6 Part

4. See infra note 23.
5. Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Estate of
O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 13641, 193-96 and accompanying text.
6. Estate of McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261; Estateof O'Neal, 258 F.3d at 1266.
7. Gowetz v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 874, 876 (1st Cir. 1963); Comm'r v. Estate of
Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Du Val's Estate v. Comm'r, 152 F.2d 103, 104
(9th Cir. 1945); Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1929); Estate of
Metcalf v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 153, 160-61 (1946), affid without opinion, 47-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 10,566 (6th Cir. 1947), available at No. 10,382, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS
3895, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1947); Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 594,597 (1936).
8. Estate of McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261; Estate of O'Neal, 258 F.3d at 1272;
Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1999); Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
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I.D discusses how the assets of an estate, irrespective of claims against
it, are valued.17

Part II describes the debate between those courts that adhere to the
date-of-death valuation rule and those that hold post-death events
should be taken into consideration in valuing a claim against the
estate. Part II is divided into sections discussing the debate for each

of the different types of claims described in Part I.B.
Part III proposes that date-of-death valuation should always be

used, and explains why that is the most convenient rule for the estate
and the rule most consistent with the method the United States
Treasury Regulations use to treat estates.
I. OVERVIEW OF26 U.S.C. §2053(A)(3)
When a person dies leaving property,' the transfer of that property
is subject to a federal estate tax. 19 The tax imposed on the taxable
17. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
18. For purposes of this Note, property includes any item that would be included
in the gross estate of the decedent. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2001). According to
Treasury Regulation § 20.2033-1(a), "[t]he gross estate of a decedent [includesl...
the value of all property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, and
wherever situated, beneficially owned by the decedent at the time of his death."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (a) (as amended in 1963).
19. Section 2001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "[a] tax is hereby
imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or
resident of the United States." I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2001). Certain estates are exempt
from paying estate taxes, depending on their value. Current regulations increase the
amount of the estate that is exempt from estate tax for each year as per the chart
below.
Year Estate Tax Exemption Top Tax Rate
2001
$675,000
55%
2002
$1,000,000
50%
2003
$1,000,000
49%
2004
$1,500,000
48%
2005
$1,500,000
47%
2006
$2,000,000
46%
2007
$2,000,000
45%
2008
$2,000,000
45%
2009
$3,500,000
45%
2010
Repealed [no estate tax]
2011
$1,000,000
55%
Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Death Tax Relief-The Road Not Taken, Personal Planning
Bulletin (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY), June 2001, at 1. For
example, if a decedent dies in 2006 leaving an estate worth $1,800,000, the estate will
not have to pay any estate taxes. If, however, the estate is worth $2,500,000 at the
time of the decedent's death in 2006, the estate will have to pay up to a forty-six
percent estate tax. There is
a one-year repeal, in the year 2010, of the estate tax ....And then, in 2011,
the... provisions of the new law, including the repeal, will disappear. The
estate.., taxes are to be restored, and all of the rate reductions and
exemption increases that take place between 2002 and 2010 will be gone,
leaving us with the same system we have today.
Id Thus, if a decedent dies in 2010 leaving an estate worth S2,500,000. the estate will
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estate, i.e., the gross estate of the decedent, is reduced by certain

enumerated deductions."0 There are a number of deductions that an
estate may take.2 1 This Note discusses deductions for claims against
the estate as per § 2053(a)(3).22 District courts, tax courts, and circuit
courts disagree on whether claims should be valued at the date of the
decedent's death or at some point thereafter,' and the Supreme Court
has not directly ruled on when to value a claim against the estate.24
While the regulations provide that claims are deductible only to the

extent that they represent "personal obligations of the decedent
existing at the time of his death,"' the value of the deductible claims
against the estate may change after the person dies, but § 2053(a)(3)
does not offer guidance of whether the value for claims against the
estate should be determined at the date of death or at some later
time.26 Changes in the amount owed by the estate can be the result of

any of the following: (1) "[r]elinquishment or extinguishment of the
claim, 2 7 (2) "[p]ayment by one other than the estate, 28 (3) reduction

not have to pay any estate tax. If, however, the decedent dies in 2011 leaving an
estate of $2,500,000, the estate will have to pay up to a fifty-five percent estate tax.
20. I.R.C. § 2051.
21. See I.R.C. §§ 2053-57.
22. I.R.C. § 2053(a) provides that:
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable
estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate
such amounts(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of, property
where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by
such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross
estate,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without
the United States, under which the estate is being administered.
I.R.C. § 2053(a); see also I.R.C. § 2001; supra note 19.
23. See infra Part II. The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held
that claims against the estate are to be valued at the date of death. See, e.g., Estate of
McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001); Estate of O'Neal v. United
States, 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th
Cir. 1999); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982). The Second and
Eighth Circuits have held that events after the decedent's death are relevant in
calculating the estate tax deductions. See, e.g., Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d
1158 (8th Cir. 1988); Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Jacobs
v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929).
24. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
25. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958); see also infra text accompanying note 42.
26. Courts have recognized that the statute is silent in determining the date for
valuing claims against an estate. See, e.g., Estate of McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1259; Estate
of Smith, 198 F.3d at 521; Propstra,680 F.2d at 1254.
27. Comment, Estate Tax-Deductions-Post-DeathEvents Relevant to Deductibility
of Claims Against the Estate Pursuant to Section 2053(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code.-Estate of Hagmann, 60 T.C. No. 51 (1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974).,
2 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625, 633 n.26(A) (1974) [hereinafter Hagmann Comment]; see
David J. Lewis, Comment, Effect of Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on the
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in the amount owed (for example, a settlement of a claim)," (4)
"[f]ailure to file the claim with the probate court,"' - or (5) changes in
legislative acts.31
This part provides a brief overview and understanding of claims
against the estate. Section A of this section discusses the history and
background of § 2053(a)(3), which explains what is required to take a
deduction for a valid claim against the estate?2 Section B then
discusses the different types of claims a creditor can have against the
estate, and provides a brief discussion of the controversy on when to
value each of those types of claims. 3 Section C indicates the
possibility that the estate or its beneficiaries may be subject to gift tax
or personal income tax as a result of the estate compromising a claim
after the decedent's death. 4 Section D discusses the date-of-death
valuation rule that is applicable for assets of the estate.- 5
A. History and Background of Estate Tax Deductionsfor Claims
Against the Estate
26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3) originated in Section 203 of the Revenue Act
of 1916, which provided that deductions be taken for claims against
the estate for purposes of determining the value of the taxable
estate.36 Section 202 of the same Act stated that "the value of the
gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death... [of] all property."' "These same
principles also apply to the present... [§] 2053(a)(3)."31
A predecessor to § 2053 was § 812, which provided that ".[f]or the
purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined...
by deducting from the value of the gross estate... claims against the
Valuation of Claims Against His Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal Estate Tax,
1972 U. Ill. L. F. 770,776 & n.52.
28. Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 633 n.26(B); see Lewis, supra note 27, at
776 & n.54.
29. Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 633 n.26(C); see Lewis, supra note 27, at

776, & nn.51, 55.
30. Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 633 n.26(D); see Lewis, supra note 27,
at 776 & n.56.
31. Lewis, supra note 27, at 776 & n.53.
32. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.

34. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
36. Craig S. Palmquist, The Estate Tax Deductibility of Unenforced ClainsAgainst
a Decedent's Estate, 11 Gonz. L. Rev. 707, 709 (1976). "The Ways and Means

Committee of the House of Representatives in its report on section 203 stated: 'In
determining the value of the net or taxable estate, deductions for all valid claims
against the estate are allowed .... ' Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916); 1939-1 (pt. 2) Cum. Bull. 22,25).
37. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 202 (1916)).
38. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4118 (1954)).
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estate."' 39 Section 812 provided that claims may be deducted 'as are
allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction.., under which the estate is
being administered.""'4 In 1954, Congress changed the statute to the
current § 2053.4
Section 2053 requires that claims are deductible only if they
"represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of
his death" and any interest that has accrued up to the time of death.42
The claim must be enforceable against the decedent's estate to be
deductible.43 If the claim is based on a promise or agreement, the
claim is limited to the amount that was actually contracted for, and the
contract must have been in consideration for "money or money's
worth."'
Sometimes, the claim against the estate is definite in amount and its
value is easy to ascertain.45 In these cases, the allowable deduction is
clear.46 In other instances, the claim against the estate may be certain
in terms of the liability, but the value of the claim may be uncertain.47
In these cases, the Treasury Regulations state that the claim may be
deducted, even though the amount of the claim is unknown, provided
that the amount will be ascertained and the claim will be paid. 8
An estate must file the estate tax within nine months after the
decedent's death,49 but may get up to a six month extension. 0
B. Types of Claims againstthe Estate
Claims against the estate may be those definite in amount and
liability at the time of death,51 those valued based on actuarial tables
39. Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 374 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960) (quoting
I.R.C. § 812(b)(3) (1939)). Significantly, the title of § 812 is "'Net estate,"' and the
statute speaks of determining the "'net estate."' Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 812). This is
arguably different from § 2053, which makes no mention of a net estate, and only
discusses the "taxable estate." I.R.C. § 2053 (a) (2001); see infra notes 303-05 and
accompanying text.
40. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d at 374 n.1 (quoting I.R.C. § 812(b)). This is
different from § 2053(a), which states that claims may be deducted "as are allowable
by the laws of the jurisdiction... under which the estate is being administered."
I.R.C. § 2053(a) (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 156,222.
41. Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra notes
39-40 and accompanying text.
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
43. Id; see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
44. I.R.C. § 2053(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4.
45. See infra Part I.B.1.
46. See infra Part II.A.1. But see infra Part II.A.2.
47. See infra Part II.C.
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972). If the amount of the
claim cannot be ascertained by the time the estate files its final return, the estate may
claim a refund with the Tax Court when the amount is finally determined. Id.; see
infra text accompanying note 332.
49. I.R.C. § 6075(a) (2001).
50. Id. 6081(a).
51. See infra Part I.B.1.
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(such as those based on life expectancy), 2 claims that are disputed or
whose amount is difficult to ascertain,5 3 claims that are enforceable at
death but later become unenforceable,- or contingent claims."
1. Definite Claims with Exact Figures
Certain claims are definite in liability and have an exact amount at
the time of death. 6 Examples of such claims include liens of an exact
amount 5 7 a liability to a creditor, or an amount owed under a
contract.59 The amount owed can be one payable in a lump sum or in
installments.6' The amount can also be reduced through agreement,
raising the question of whether the claim should be valued at the
amount it was worth at death, regardless of any post-death events, or
whether it should be valued to reflect the amount of any post-death
compromise.61
2. Claims Based on Actuarial Tables
Some claims are definite in liability, yet the amount cannot be
determined without the use of actuarial tables.' In these claims the
estate attempts to take a deduction based on tables that determine
how long a beneficiary will live.' 3 The debate regarding these claims,
for estate tax purposes, is whether such tables should be used to
calculate the value as of the date of the death of the decedent, or
whether actual facts that change the value of the claims after the
death should be considered.'

52. See infra Part I.B.2.
53. See infra Part I.B.3.
54. See infra Part I.B.4.
55. See infra Part I.B.5.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
57. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. See, e.g., Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265 (11 th Cir. 2001).
59. See, eg., Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929).
60. Lewis, supra note 27, at 776; see Estate of Nesselrodt v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1406, 1410 (1986) (holding that the estate was allowed to pay a lump sum for a
claim that was to be paid in installments, but the estate may only deduct the present
value of the claim); see also infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
61. See infra Part II.A.
62. The Treasury Regulations provide actuarial tables to determine -remainder
factors" that exist at the time of the decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (as
amended in 2000); see Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929): Comm'r
v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Estate of Lester v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.
503 (1972); infra Part II.B.
63. See, e.g, Estate of Lester, 57 T.C. at 505-06. The use of actuarial tables was also
at issue in Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d at 373-74; see also infra notes 158-81 and
accompanying text.
64. See infra Part II.B.
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3. Claims Where the Amount Owed is Difficult to Prove and Disputed
Claims
There are cases, such as a tort claim, "when the events creating
legal liability occur before death, and the amount of the claim cannot
be determined until settlement or legal adjudication even though the65
existence of the claim itself is fixed as of the date of death."
Similarly, there are instances where a claim may be fixed in value, but
the estate disputes either the amount owed or its liability altogether.'

Here, the question is whether the claims should be valued based on
facts known up to the date of death, or whether they should be valued
based on the amount that is later proved or agreed on. 67

4. Enforceable Claims That Later Become Unenforceable
A claim must be allowed by the jurisdiction in which the decedent
resided for the claim to be enforceable. 63 There are claims
enforceable at death that the estate will not pay because of
subsequent events.69
When a person dies, the claimant must file a claim against the estate

with the probate court of the decedent's home state to collect on the

claim.7" A claimant, however, may neglect to file (or may voluntarily

decide not to file) a claim within the specified period for filing the
claim against the estate, thereby rendering the claim unenforceable.'
A claim may similarly become unenforceable due to a change in the
law. Here, the claim is valid and enforceable at the time of death, but
the estate does not pay, and has no intention of paying, the claim
because it becomes invalid due to a change in the law.72
65. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 707-08 (footnote omitted); see Robert Clive Jones,
Comment, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent
to Date of Death, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 654, 671 (1975); Lewis, supra note 27, at 774.
66. See, e.g., Gowetz v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963); Estate of Metcalf v.
Comm'r, 7 T.C. 153 (1946); infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
67. See infra Part II.C.
68. Section 2053(a) provides that claims may be deducted "as are allowable by the
laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States, under which the
estate is being administered." I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2001); supra note 22; see Treas. Reg. §
20.2053-4 (1958); supra text accompanying note 43; infra note 236.
69. See, e.g., Estate of Nesselrodt v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1406 (1986);
Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936); see also infra notes 242-56 and accompanying
text.
70. See Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493, 497-99 (N.D. 111. 1966)
(discussing filing the claim with the state probate court); Winer v. United States, 153
F. Supp. 941, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same); Estate of Bankhead v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.
535, 537 (1973) (same).
71. See, e.g., Russell, 260 F. Supp at 497-99; Winer, 153 F. Supp. at 942. "In most
states a general creditor is required to file his claim within a specific period or the
claim is barred notwithstanding that the general statute of limitations otherwise
applicable to his claim has not run." Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 633 n.27.
72. See, e.g., Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. at 596; see also infra notes 242-45 and
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The debate regarding this type of claim is whether the estate should
be able to take the deduction for the claim because the claim was
enforceable at death, or whether it should be barred from taking the
deduction because some later event has rendered the claim
unenforceable.7 3
5. Contingent Claims
A contingent claim is a claim where the decedent becomes liable
when someone else who is the primary debtor does not pay the debt! 4
There is a legal obligation that has value existing at the time of death,
but the estate may never have to pay the debt.' At the date of the
decedent's death, it can appear likely that the estate will have to pay a
certain amount to a creditor, much as it is likely that the estate will
have to pay a certain amount on a claim that is disputed or difficult to
ascertain until later.76 Similarly, it is possible for a court to find that at
the date of the decedent's death, the value of the contingent claim,
like a disputed claim or a claim whose value is difficult to ascertain in
value, cannot yet be determined.' The debate in this type of claim is
whether a contingent claim can be deducted, and, if so, how such a
claim is to be valued.78

C. The Possibility of an Estate Being Subject to a Gift Tax or a
Dischargeof Indebtedness Tax if It Compromises a Claim
When an estate pays less or none of a claim that it owed, the estate
is in effect worth more than it would have been if it had to pay the full
debt.79 The extinguishment of all or part of the claim, therefore, is a
realization of income for the estate and/or for the estate's
beneficiaries.'0 In estate taxation, however, there is no specific
accompanying text.

73. See infra Part II.D.
74. Pahnquist, supra note 36, at 717. An example of a contingent claim is "where
the decedent was secondarily liable as an accommodation endorser or as a guarantor

of another's obligation and that obligation is not extinguished by his death." id.
75. Id. at 717-18. The contingent claim may be for a certain and definite amount
(for example, the decedent was a co-signer on a loan). For a discussion of claims that
are certain in liability and definite in amount, see supra Part I.B.1.

76. Theoretically, courts can value a contingent claim at the date of death much
the same way courts have valued disputed claims at the date of death. See infra Parts
II.C., II.E., III.B.
77. See supra Part I.B.3; infra Parts II.C, II-E, III.B.
7M See infra Part II.E.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
80. Estate of Bankhead v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 535, 539-40 (1973); Jones, supra note
65, at 655. An "increase in net worth caused by a reduction of indebtedness has long

been regarded as a source of income under section 61 and the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. [284 U.S. 1 (1931)1." Id. at 657-58; see

also Palmquist, supra note 36, at 718. In Estate of Bankhead, 60 T.C. 535 (1973), the
Tax Court held that the estate "was enlarged" by virtue of the cancellation of debt.
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provision for taxing a discharge of indebtedness. 81 The individual
beneficiaries, however, may have to pay personal income tax on the
greater estate that they receive.82
Aside from additional tax on a discharge of indebtedness, 83 the
beneficiaries may alternatively have to pay gift taxes. 4 "If the
necessary donative intent is present [or if the creditor intentionally
waives his claim,] the creditor's action may be interpreted as a gift to
' The beneficiaries, then, might still have to pay tax
the beneficiaries."85
86
on the extinguishments of the claim in this manner.

The forgiveness of all or part of the debt might be considered a gift
either to the estate or to its beneficiaries.
If the forgiveness of a debt was compensation for decedent's prior
services, it is clearly income ....But if the cancellation of debt was
granted to the estate as a "gift"-i.e., made with donative intentJones, supra note 65, at 657 n.14. If a court or statute were to apply Estate of
Bankhead directly with respect to estate tax, an estate would be subject to a discharge
of indebtedness tax applicable to the increase in its net worth as a result of
compromising a claim. Id. at 657. This would essentially put the estate in the same tax
position regardless of when the claim against the estate is valued, as post-death events
would necessarily be relevant in calculating the deduction. It seems that such an
application, however, would be contrary to the Treasury Regulations. Any income
that the estate realizes would be considered property of the estate, but the gross
estate of the decedent for estate tax purposes includes only property that the
decedent owned "at the time of his death." Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (as amended in
1963); see also supra note 18. Since the "discharge" of the debt in these cases happens
after death, a tax on the amount the estate realized from the discharge appears to be
in direct conflict with the Treasury Regulation's intent.
81. This is not the case in income tax. For personal income tax purposes, when an
individual's debt is extinguished, the individual realizes additional income that is
taxable on his income tax return. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2001); see also id. § 108(a)
(delineating exceptions to the general rule in § 61(a)(12)).
82. See Estate of Bankhead, 60 T.C. at 540 (holding sole beneficiary of the estate
realized additional income for the purpose of income tax through the extinguishment
of the estate's debt). This may lead to higher tax rates for each of the beneficiaries in
the year that the claim is extinguished or compromised because each of the
beneficiaries will be paying taxes on all of their personal income, including the extra
portion of the estate that they received due to the estate's discharge of indebtedness.
For income tax rates, see I.R.C § 1.
83. Even though there is no discharge of indebtedness tax in estate tax, the estate
will pay additional tax when a claim is compromised in a jurisdiction that takes into
consideration post-death events in valuing a claim against the estate. See supra text
accompanying notes 2-4.
84. See Palmquist, supra note 36, at 718-19. Section 102 of the Internal Revenue
Code states that "[g]ross income does not include the value of property acquired by
gift." I.R.C. § 102. The first $10,000 of the "gift" in this case is not taxable, but if the
extinguishment of the claim is for more than $10,000 (adjusted for inflation), the
additional amount is taxable as personal income to the beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
85. See Palmquist, supra note 36, at 718-19. For a discussion of donative intent,
see Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
86. The estate will not have to pay a gift tax because the gift essentially is "given"
after the date of the decedent's death, and therefore, cannot be included as part of the
estate's property, which is determined at the date of death. See I.R.C. § 2033; Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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there will be no taxable income upon cancellation since the Code
excludes gifts from the determination of gross income. In agreeing

to a debt compromise, an estate creditor may have mixed motives.
Depending on the creditor's relation to the deceased or estate
beneficiaries, the executor may have grounds for claiming that the
forgiveness was intended as a gift. s7

Creditors, however, rarely intend a gift to the estate when
compromising a claim. Like all creditors, they are compromising by
looking for the "best price available" and "intend no gift."' Donative
intent can still be proven, however, if the creditor is a relative or a
beneficiary of the estate.89

D. Valuation of Assets
"The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's
gross estate.., is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's

death."90 The value of assets is determined as of the date of death,
and post-death events that alter the value of the assets in the estate
are not considered when taxing the estate. Similarly, only the assets
owned by the estate at the time of death are subject to estate tax.9
There are instances, however, when the value of the assets is
difficult to determine at the date of the decedent's death. 9 The estate,
despite the difficulties, must attempt to value the assets for purposes
of estate tax.93

In Estate of Curry v. Commissioner,94 an attorney was working on
various cases on a contingent fee basis.95 The attorney died before the
cases were resolved and, thus, before any result that would determine

whether the attorney would get paid.9 ' The question in Estate of
Curry was whether a contingent asset can be included as an asset for
estate tax purposes, and, if so, how the contingent asset should be
valued. 97 The Tax Court held that the contingent asset was property
for estate tax purposes and must be included in the decedent's gross
87. Jones, supra note 65, at 658 (footnotes omitted).
88. Id. at 659.
89. Id.
90. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b); see I.R.C. §§ 2031(a), 2033; supra notes 18-19 and
accompanying text. Claims where the decedent is a creditor are also included in the
decedent's assets for determining the estate tax. Such claims are valued at the date of
the decedent's death. Estate of Curry v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 540, 546 (1980); see infra
notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 18.
92. Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 221 (8th ed. 2000).
93. Id. at 212. "Section 2033 brings into the gross estate a wvide range of
unliquidated, speculative, contingent, and defeasible claims and interests, even though
the value of the asset is not readily ascertainable." Id.
94. 74 T.C. 540 (1980).
95. Id. at 541-42.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 540, 545.
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estate under § 2033.98 The court held that the contingent asset still
had a value, which should be determined at the date of death.9 The
court ruled that the total value of all the contingent cases was
$165,000.1° It determined this value by examining the type of cases
the decedent had, the likelihood of recovery based on similar cases,
the likely amount to be recovered based on amounts recovered in
other similar cases, and the stage in which the case was at the time of
the decedent's death (i.e., the earlier in the litigation stage the case is,
the more difficult it is to determine its value, and therefore the case is
worth less based on the other factors). 1 1 The court considered all of
these factors as they existed at the time of the decedent's death."t
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that a contingent asset should be valued
at the date of death. 103 In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("the Commissioner")
argued that a "contingent right... is an asset of the [e]state."' t 4 The
Commissioner did not argue that because it was unsure whether the
estate will ever acquire the contingent asset, that the contingent asset
should not be counted as an asset for estate tax purposes. 1 5 Instead,
the Commissioner argued that the "contingent nature" of the asset
should affect the value of the asset.1"
Other courts have similarly found that uncertainties concerning the
value of property should be considered in valuing the property, and
that the valuation of the assets should occur at the date of death."W

Although there is a debate on when to value claims against the estate,
98. Id. at 545-47; see Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (as amended in 1963); see also supra
note 18.
99. Estate of Curry, 74 T.C. at 547-51. The court stated:
The fact that the legal fees ...were contingent upon future recovery., is a
critical consideration in trying to determine what the contract right was
worth as of the date of death. However, the contingent nature of the
contract right must bear on the factual question of valuation. It cannot, as a
matter of law, preclude the inclusion of the interest in the decedent's gross
estate or command that the value be fixed at zero. Although uncertainty as
to the value of a contract right may postpone the inclusion of the income
until it is actually realized for income tax purposes, for estate tax purposes,
the value of an asset must be determined in order to close the estate.
Id. at 546-47; see also Bittker et al., supra note 92, at 213 (discussing Estate of Curry).
100. Estate of Curry, 74 T.C. at 551.

101. Id. at 550-51.
102. Id. at 551. The court "recognize[d] that, while there were ultimately
substantial awards in some instances, in estimating the date-of-death value of these
claims, we must be satisfied with some imprecision." Id. The court, then, did not
consider post-death events that changed the value of the estate's assets.
103. Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515,528 (5th Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 527.
105. Id.
106. Id. A claim or asset in controversy would probably have a smaller value than
a similar claim that is not in controversy. See Gowetz v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 874, 876
(1st Cir. 1963); supra text accompanying note 101; infra note 207.
107. See Bittker et al., supra note 92, at 214 (citing First Victoria Nat'l. Bank v.
United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980)).

2002]

THE I.R.C. §2053(a)(3) CONTROVERSY

2717

there does not seem to be a debate on when to value the assets of an
estate. As Estate of Curry points out, post-death events may not be
considered in valuing the assets of the estate for estate tax purposes.111
The difference in treatment for claims and assets seems to be a
contradictory policy, since both are a part of the estate that is
transferred at death.
II. WHEN TO VALUE CLAIMS AGAINST AN ESTATE FOR ESTATE TAX
PURPOSES

Although circuits disagree on when to value the claims against an
estate, 109 the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue.
Circuit courts on both sides point to the most relevant Supreme Court
holding, Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States."u In Ithaca Trust, the
decedent died leaving his wife a life estate, with the remainder to be
dispersed upon her death to enumerated charities."' The decedent's
wife died shortly after the decedent, living for less than her life
expectancy as determined by actuarial tables."' The question for the
Court was whether the value of the estate remaining to the charities
should be determined by the events as they occurred, i.e., the fact that
the wife died six months after the decedent, or "by mortality tables
showing the probabilities [of the wife's life expectancy] as they stood
on the day when the testator died.""'
The Court held that even
though the life span of the wvife was a known factor, her life estate
must be valued using mortality tables as of the date of the decedent's
death."' Therefore, the value of the estate passing to charities was
measured by the length of time that the wife was expected to have an
interest in the property at the date of the husband's death, rather than
the length of time that she actually had an interest in the property,
which was ascertainable only after the decedent died." '
The Ithaca Trust decision would seem to have ended the dispute, as
all circuits that value the estate tax deduction for claims against the
estate at the date of the decedent's death cite to Ithaca Trust as
precedent 1 6 However, circuits that hold post-death events are
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id at 221-22.
See supra note 23.
279 U.S. 151 (1929).
Id. at 154.
Id at 154-55. Life expectancy is based on the Treasury Regulation's life

expectancy charts. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (as amended in 2000): supra note 62.
113. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding "that the date-of-death valuation rule announced in Ithaca Trust applies to a
deduction for a claim against the estate under Section 2053 (a)(3)"); Estate of O'Neal
v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001) (following the analysis in Ithaca
Trust to apply the date-of-death rule); Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 524
(5th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Ithaca Trust to mean that the value of the property
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relevant in valuing deductions for claims against the estate limit the
holding of Ithaca Trust to valuation of charitable remainder
interests. 7 The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since
Ithaca Trust, and has never addressed the issue of when to specifically
value claims against the estate for .purposes of § 2053(a)(3)
deductions.
This part discusses the debate among circuits on when to value the
different claims against the estate and the reasoning that different
courts use to find either that a date-of-death valuation is appropriate
or that a consideration of post-death events is appropriate. Section A
discusses the controversy on how to value claims with exact figures." 8
Section B discusses the debate on whether to consider post-death
events when the value of the claim is based on actuarial tables." 9
Section C discusses the debate on when to value claims that are
disputed or whose value is difficult to prove. 120 Section D discusses
whether claims that are enforceable at the date of the decedent's2
death, but later become unenforceable, should be deducted.1 '
Section E discusses whether post-death events should be considered
when the claim is contingent on a subsequent event.'2
A. The Debate SurroundingClaims with Exact Figures
1. Claims with Definite Liability and Exact Figures Should Be Valued
at the Date of Death
Unlike disputed claims or claims whose value is difficult to
ascertain,'1 3 where there is a regulation raising uncertainty as to
whether post-death events should be considered in valuing a claim
against the estate,124 no such regulation exists to govern the valuation
of certain and enforceable claims against the estate. The closest
regulation that can be used to argue for valuation of claims at the date
of death is § 20.2053-4, which provides that "[t]he amounts that may
should be ascertained at the "date-of-death"); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d
1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding it "is consistent with the teaching of Ithaca Trust"
to hold that deductions must be based on claims against the estate that exist at the
time of the decedent's death).
117. See, e.g., Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 1988)

(holding that charitable bequests must be determined at the date of death, but when
valuing claims against the estate under § 2053(a)(3), events after the decedent's death
may be taken into consideration).
118. See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 158-81 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 182-218 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 219-56 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 257-72 and accompanying text.
123. See supra Part I.B.3; infra Part II.C.
124. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); supra note 48 and
accompanying text; infra notes 182-84, 197-99 and accompanying text.
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be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are such only [that]
represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of
his death, whether or not then matured, and interest thereon which
had accrued at the time of death.""5 One can argue, then, that
according to the Treasury Regulations, the values of claims must be
determined at the date of death because those were the values that
were "existing at the time of [the decedent's] death."' 26 "[I]f a claim is
certain in amount and enforceable at decedent's death, then
consideration of subsequent events is more difficult to justify under a
literal reading of the Code and regulations."' 7
In Propstrav. United States,-8 the decedent died leaving a one-half
interest in several pieces of real estate, two of which had liens in the
total amount of $404,846.11.' 9 The executrix deducted the decedent's
portion of the debt ($202,423.05) when she computed the value of the
estate for the purposes of estate tax."3 Twenty-two months after filing
the estate tax return, the estate settled the claim and paid $134,826.23
to fully satisfy the lien claims against the estate.'' One year later, the
Commissioner issued the estate a letter of deficiency for unpaid taxes
claiming that "the estate was entitled to deduct only the amount
actually paid in discharge of the.. . lien claim."''
In Propstra, the Ninth Circuit held that lien claims, which are
certain and enforceable, are to be valued at the date of death. 3 For
claims in which "sums [are] certain and are legally enforceable as of
the date of death, post-death events are not relevant in computing the
permissible deduction."'" The court found that "estate tax is a tax on
the privilege of transfering [sic] property upon one's death, [so] the
property to be valued for estate tax purposes is that which the
decedent actually transfers at his death."'3 5
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
note 42.
126. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4.
127. Jones, supra note 65, at 672.
128. 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 1250.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Commissioner, therefore, was arguing that the value of the claim at
the time of the decedent's death is not relevant for purposes of a § 2053(a)(3)
deduction. What is relevant, the Commissioner argued, is the amount actually settled
for and paid to the creditor, even though the settlement occurred after the decedent
died.
133. Id. at 1254.
134. Id. The court found that only claims that are certain and enforceable at the
time of death should be valued at the date of death. Claims that are disputed or
contingent, the court argued, must take into account post-death events when valuing
claims against the estate. Id. at 1253; see also infra note 267.
135. Propstra,680 F.2d at 1250. The court found that valuing the claim at the time
of death is consistent with the holding in Ithaca Tnst v. United States, 279 U.S. 151
(1929), and that the holding in Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929),
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In a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, the court in Estate
of McMorris v. Commissioner136 found that "events which occur after
the decedent's death may not be considered in valuing that
deduction. '137 In Estate of McMorris, the decedent owed income
taxes, and the estate settled the claim after her death for less than
what the Commissioner said she originally owed. 138
The
Commissioner said that the estate can only deduct the amount
actually paid (the settled amount) because the deduction is limited to
the amount of taxes ultimately owed. 139 The estate argued that
settlement is irrelevant because the value of the deduction should be
determined as of the date of the decedent's death. 4 The court
agreed, reasoning that a date-of-death valuation provides a "bright
line rule" and gets rid of uncertainty and delay in administering the
estate.14'
2. Post-Death Events Are Relevant in Determining the Value of
Claims Against the Estate That Are Definite in Liability and Have
Exact Figures
When later events alter the amount of a claim that was certain in
amount and liability at the date of death, "the amount of the
deduction becomes subject to controversy." 4 '
In Jacobs v.
Commissioner,143 the decedent, in an antenuptial contract, provided
that if his wife outlived him, she would get a $75,000 lump sum
payment out of his estate in lieu of any other marital rights.'4 His will
stated that his wife could elect to forego the $75,000 owed to her in
the contract and instead be paid $250,000 out of his estate in
installment payments over the span of her life. 145 After the decedent's
death, the wife accepted the terms of the will rather than the $75,000,
but the executors deducted the $75,000 as a claim against the estate
when filing the estate tax return.1 46 The Eighth Circuit disallowed the
deduction for that amount finding that "[t]ax laws deal with
which ruled that post-death events should be considered in valuing claims against the
estate, is distinguishable. Propstra,680 F.2d at 1256; see also infra note 143.
136. 243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).
137. Id. at 1261.
138. Id. at 1258.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1261-62.
142. Lewis, supra note 27, at 776.
143. 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929). Jacobs has sometimes been regarded as a
contingent claim case. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir.
1982); Palmquist, supra note 36, at 714. For a description of contingent claims, see
supra Part I.B.5. Significantly, Jacobs was decided only three-and-a-half months after
the Supreme Court's ruling in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
144. Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 233.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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actualities" and that "[t]he claims which Congress intended to be

deducted were actual claims, not theoretical ones."'

7

The court

reasoned that there was no claim for which a deduction can be taken

in this case because the wife never claimed any of the $75,000 from
the estate, and the estate never paid any of it."4 The court stated that
Congress intended the words "claim against the estate" to incorporate
only claims that
were presented, allowed, and paid (or would be paid)
49
by the estate.1

The court in Jacobs held that the intended purpose of the statute
must have been to consider post-death events that change the value of
the claims because the same statute allowing deductions for claims
against the estate also allows deductions for funeral and
administration expenses, both of which do not arise until after the
decedent has died. 5 ' The Eighth Circuit, therefore, concluded that
events that change the value of claims against the estate after the
decedent has died should be considered when claiming the deduction.
Several courts and members of the legal community have
subscribed to the Jacobs "actuality" approach.' 51 They argue that

estate tax had traditionally been thought of as a tax on the transfer of
the property at the death of the decedent, but that a better approach

may be to consider it a tax on the interest that the beneficiaries
receive. 52
This suggests that post-death events should be
considered. 53 Others have argued that Ithaca Trust should not be
extended to claims against the estate and have preferred the holding

147. Id at 235.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id at 236; see I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2001); supra note 22. The court also pointed
out that the Supreme Court never said that only the date-of-death valuation can be
used. Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236.
151. See Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 631-33, 633 nn.26-27, 637; Lewis,
supra note 27, at 782-84.
152. Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 637.
153. Id. It can be argued that Jacobs correctly interpreted legislative intent of §
2053(a): "Congress has enacted several provisions that shift the emphasis on the
valuation of deductions to focus more precisely on the economic benefits flowing to
the decedent's successors." Id. Evidence of this shift can be seen in the following
facts:
(1) After Ithaca, Congress limited the amount of the charitable deduction to
the amount actually received by the charity;
(2) In a predecessor section to § 2053(c)(2), Congress in 1942 reacted to circuit
courts that allowed deductions for claims against the estate even though the estate did
not have assets to pay the creditors. Congress denied the deduction unless the claims
were in fact paid or the estate, based on its assets, could pay;
(3) The marital deduction provisions provide that deductions shall take into
account any taxes or encumbrance imposed on the property, which show that
Congress intended to shift the focus of the deductions to the benefit actually received
by the beneficiary. This necessarily means that post-death events are to be taken into
account.
Id at 637-638, 638 n.44; see I.R.C. § 2056.
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in Jacobs.54 The argument is that extending Ithaca Trust to claims
against the estate "would frustrate congressional policy.'1 55 In
addition, § 2053(a) states that claims must be "allowable" in the
jurisdiction where the estate is being administered, so it must be that
Congress intended that only claims the probate court allows can be
deducted; the court's decision of which claims to allow happens after
death. 56 Also, the deduction for claims against the estate is grouped
with the deductions for funeral and administration expenses, which
means "Congress must have intended the amounts of deductions for
all three
items to be determined during the administration of the
1 57
estate.
B. The Debate SurroundingClaims Against the Estate Where the Value
of the Claim is Ascertainableat the Date of Death UsingActuarial
Tables
1. Claims Against the Estate That Can Be Calculated Based on
Actuarial Tables Should Be Calculated Solely Based on Those Tables
at the Date of Death
In Estate of Lester v. Commissioner,"8 the decedent, in his divorce
decree, agreed to pay his wife $130,000 in monthly installments of
$1000.159 The decree also provided that if the husband died before his
wife, the estate would continue to make the payments at $1000 per
month until the balance was paid or until his wife died, whichever
occurred first."6 The husband had made nineteen payments at the
time of his death, leaving the estate with 111 payments to make on the
remaining balance assuming the wife did not die before that full
balance was paid.' 61 The estate made twenty-four payments totaling
$24,000, leaving a balance of $87,000.16 A Wisconsin court then
ordered the estate to purchase for the wife "a Single Premium
Immediate Annuity Certain, Non-participating" which would pay the
monthly payments until the entire the balance was paid. 63 Over two
years after the decedent died, the estate purchased the annuity for
154. Lewis, supra note 27, at 782-84.
155. Id. at 782; see supra note 153.
156. Lewis, supra note 27, at 782-83; see also I.R.C. § 2053(a); Treas. Reg. §

20.2053-4 (1958).
157. Lewis, supra note 27, at 783; Note, Federal Estate Tax: Effect of Subsequent
Events on the Valuation of Claims Against the Estate, 1961 Duke L.J. 474, 478
[hereinafter Federal Estate Tax]; see I.R.C. § 2053(a); supra note 150 and

accompanying text.
158. 57 T.C. 503 (1972).

159. Id. at 504.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 504-05.
162. Id. at 505.
163. Id.
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$78,700.1' Ten months prior to the purchase of the annuity, the estate
had claimed a deduction in the amount of $111,000 for the vife's claim
against the estate for the 111 payments due on the balance remaining
at the date of the decedent's death.11 The Commissioner claimed that
the amount outstanding, for the purposes of taking a § 2053(a)(3)
deduction, after the decedent died should be the present value at the
date of death, i.e., that the $1000 should be reduced to its value at the
date of death.1" The estate argued, in the alternative, that it should
be allowed to deduct: (1) the face value of the claim outstanding at
the date of death of $111,000, (2) the amount actually paid to the
claimant plus the cost to the estate of the annuity purchased, or (3)
the present worth of the annuity plus the interest, which was
$96,021.49.17 The Tax Court held that Ithaca Trust applies when, like
here, "on the date of death the estate's obligation is one which will be
satisfied in the future."1 6 The value of the claim, then, is determined
by the actuarial tables, which take into consideration the wife's life
expectancy, and not what actually happened subsequent to the
decedent's death.1 69
The argument for using date-of-death valuations for claims based
on actuarial tables is that the estate is settled "as of the date of the
testator's death," and therefore, the estate must be taxed when the
decedent dies.17 The court in Ithaca Trust reasoned that although it is
"[t]empting... to correct uncertain probabilities by... now certain
fact[s] ... [nevertheless] the value of the... [claim] must be estimated
by the mortality tables. '7
2. Post-Death Events Should Be Considered Even When Actuarial
Tables Can Be Used To Determine the Value of Claims Against the
Estate
The Second Circuit has ruled that if an event after the decedent's
death changes the value of the claim against the estate, that value
should similarly be reflected in the amount allowed for deduction. In

164. Id. The estate incurred costs in purchasing the annuity. Before the estate

purchased the annuity, it was paying the decedent's wife $1000 a month that was owed
to her under the divorce decree. Id.
165. Id. at 506.
166. Id The Commissioner claimed a notice of deficiency and computed the claim
at the date of death using actuarial tables for estate and gift tax to be $92,456.16. Id.
Interestingly, the Commissioner here argued for a date-of-death valuation of the
claim, and asked the court to disregard post-death events that changed the value of
the claim. Usually, the Commissioner argues that post-death events should be
considered in valuing claims against the estate.
167. Id. at 506.
168. Id. at 507.
169. Id.
170. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
171. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 114.
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Commissioner v. Estate of Shively,7 2 the decedent and his wife
entered into a separation agreement providing that after their son
turned twenty-one, the decedent would pay his wife forty dollars per
week until her death or until she remarries (whichever comes first),
and that should decedent die, the estate shall continue to make the
payments under the contract. 173 The decedent died in July 1952, and
the estate made payments to the wife until June 1953, when the wife
remarried. 74 In July 1953, the estate filed the estate tax return and
claimed a deduction of $27,058.30 based on the wife's actuarial tables
computed at the time of the decedent's death. 75 The Commissioner
argued that the deduction should be limited to $2,079.96, which was
the amount actually paid to Mrs. Shively "during
the period the estate
' 76
was in probate and prior to her remarriage.'
The Second Circuit found that the deduction could be no greater
than the amount actually paid by the estate, and allowed to be paid by
the laws of the state where the estate tax return is filed, "irrespective
of whether this amount is established through events occurring before
or after the decedent's death.' '1 77 Because Mrs. Shively did not file a
claim with the probate court for the amount which the estate is
claiming a deduction (if she had it would have been denied due to her
remarriage), the estate cannot deduct it as a valid claim, despite the
fact that it was valid at the time of the decedent's death.178 The
Second Circuit disagreed with other courts that value claims only at
the date of death, and found that the purpose for these deductions is
to determine what property actually passes to the beneficiary after all
the claims have been paid and that
this purpose would not be served if a deduction were permitted for
claims against an estate which, though having vitality as of date of
death, could never be enforced as of the date the estate tax return is
filed .... To permit an estate such a deduction... would be to

172.
173.
174.
175.

276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 373-74.

176. Id. at 374. "[T]he Commissioner concede[d] that at the time of [Mr.] Shively's
death the present value of Mrs. Shively's... claim against the estate could be
actuarially determined with reasonable accuracy." Id.

177. Id. at 377. The court found that the estate may only deduct the claims against

the estate "'as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction... under which the estate is
being administered."' Id. at 374 (quoting I.R.C. § 812(b) (1939), a predecessor to
I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2001)). The court's holding suggests that for purposes of valuing a

claim against the estate, events that happen up until the estate files its tax return may
be taken into consideration. Federal Estate Tax, supra note 157, at 479. This
approach, however, would allow the estate to manipulate the amount of the

deduction by planning to file the estate tax return at a time when the deduction is
greatest and then settling the claim right after the return is filed. Id.
178. Estateof Shively, 276 F.2d at 374.
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prefer fiction
to reality and would defeat the clear purpose of [the
79
statute].
Actuarial tables, therefore, should not be used when the claim can
be determined by facts, even if the facts did not exist at the time of the
decedent's death. "If valuation is accomplished on the basis of
mathematical probabilities at the date of death, subsequent events will
often make this valuation appear absurd."'"
Taking into account
post-death events even when valuation is feasible through actuarial
tables is congruent with the Jacobs "actuality" approach.' 8 ,
C. The Debate SurroundingDisputed Claims or Claims Where the
Value is Difficult to Ascertain at the Date of Death
1. The Value of the Claim Should Be Determined by Facts Existent at
the Date of Death
Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3) provides that "[a]n item may
be entered on the [estate tax] return for deduction though its exact
amount is not then known, provided it is ascertainable with
reasonable certainty, and will be paid.""
Based on this regulation, it
can be argued that even disputed claims, and claims with an amount
difficult to ascertain, can be valued at the date of death based on facts
available up to, but not after, that date. Further, it can be argued that
since assets that are disputed must be valued based on facts known up
to the date of death, and post-death events that affect the valuation of
the asset should not be considered, 1 3 the same should apply for claims
against the estate. 184
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,"' the estate settled a claim
fifteen months after the decedent's death for less than the claimed
deduction. 86 The Commissioner said that because the claim was
disputed as of the date of decedent's death, the estate can only deduct
what it actually paid in the settlement.", The court found that a claim
against the estate "must be valued as of the date of the death of the
decedent and thus must [be] appraised on information known or

179. Id. at 375.
180. FederalEstate Tax, supra note 157, at 480. "On the other hand, if subsequent
facts are considered, the unexpected occurrence of a contingency may overturn a
carefully constructed estate plan, necessarily framed on the basis of probabilities." Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 147, 151.
182. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see supra text
accompanying notes 45-47; supra note 48 and accompanying text; supra Part B.3.
183. See supra Part I.D.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 292-95.
185. 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999).
186. Id. at 519-20.
187. Id. at 520.
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available up to (but not after) that date."'" The value of the claim
must be appraised "based on the facts as they existed as of death."'' 9
The court found that in Ithaca Trust,1"' the Supreme Court was trying
to impose the tax "on the act of transferring property... [which
happens at] the instant of death."'' The Fifth Circuit also found that
"the Eighth Circuit's narrow reading of Ithaca Trust, a reading
that
192
limits its application to charitable bequests, is unwarranted.'

In a case of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the court in
Estate of O'Neal v. United States,193 found that valuation of claims
against the estate occurs at the date of death and that events which
occur after death that alter the valuation must be disregarded. 94 In

Estate of O'Neal, the estate settled with the IRS, after the decedent
had died, the value of a gift given to the decedent prior to his death,
which changed the amount of taxes that the decedent owed at the
time of his death.'

The court found that post-death settlement

should not be taken into account in valuing the estate.'96

2. The Value of a Disputed or a Difficult to Value Claim Against the
Estate Should be Determined by Post-Death Events

Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3) states that "[n]o deduction
may be taken upon the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate."'" The
regulation goes on to provide a period after death in which the estate
can determine the amount of the liability. 9 This would suggest that
post-death events and facts that are discovered after death can be

taken into account in valuing disputed or unascertainable claims.

99

188. Id. at 517.
189. Id. at 521.
190. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
191. Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 524.
192. Id. The court found that exceptions to the date-of-death valuation are "§§
2053(a)(1) (funeral expenses), 2053(a)(2) (estate administration expenses), and 2054
(casualty losses)." Id. at 524 n.36. Contra Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir.
1929) (arguing that because deductions for claims against the estate, funeral expenses,
and administration expenses are all in the same section, congressional intent was that
all three must consider post-death events when valuing the deductions); see supra text
accompanying notes 150, 157.
193. 258 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1268.
196. Id. at 1275. The court also found that limiting Ithaca Trust to only cases of
charitable bequests is not a correct reading of Ithaca Trust. Id. at 1273 n.25.
197. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see supra text
accompanying notes 45-47; supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Part I.B.3.
198. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3).
199. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 707-08. Regarding claims where the amount is
difficult to determine, "the amount of the deduction will be the amount finally
determined after a settlement or judgment is reached." Id. at 708; see Jones, supra
note 65, at 671 (arguing that disputed claims "must" be valued by post-death events,
and that "[i]f the estate compromises a disputed claim for less than the amount
originally due on the obligation, then only the lesser sum is deductible"); Lewis, supra
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In Gowetz v. Commissioner,200 the decedent entered into a
separation agreement with his wife to pay her $500 a month for life or
until she remarried.2 "1
Upon the decedent's death, the estate
deducted the wife's claim, and discounted to the value at the time of
the decedent's death based on actuarial tables, but it also denied all
liability owed to the wife and defended a separate suit brought by her
instate court. 212 During the state court suit, the wife remarried, thus
terminating any future rights under the separation agreement and
reducing the amount the estate would have to pay her.' The estate
lost the state case and had to pay the wife any money owed to her
under the agreement up to the point of her remarriage.2z
The
Commissioner reduced the deduction to the amount that the estate
actually paid.2 5 The First Circuit held that events after death can be
2
considered for purposes of deductions for claims against the estate 6
The court found that the estate's position is "in conflict with the
statutory scheme, which has frequently been construed to encompass
after events rather than to require valuation as of the date of
death."207
In Estate of Metcalf v. Commissioner,2 the decedent owned real
estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, where he owed taxes and
penalties in the amount of $17,204.54 at the date of death." 9
Approximately one year after his death, the estate settled the taxes on
the real estate for $7,678.18.11 The decedent also owned real estate in
Dyer County, Tennessee, where at the time of death he owed
note 27, at 774 ("[W]hen disputed or contingent claims are involved, subsequent
events must be taken into account to fix the ultimate amount of liability. Only when
the estate's liability has been ascertained, or payment has been made, or payment of a
definite sum has been assured, may a deduction be taken.").
200. 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963).
201. Id. at 875.
202. Id. The court in that separate suit had not decided whether the estate was
liable to the wife, and the estate believed that it could be successful in defending the
suit brought by the decedent's wife. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. The lower court found for the Commissioner by finding a difference
between those claims that can be determined by actuarial tables and those that are
"disputed," "contingent," or "potential." Id. at 876. The lower court found that these
latter claims are not as measurable as those that are fixed in liability and those whose
amount is left to be determined by actuarial tables. Id.
206. Id. The court declined to evaluate how far into the future events should be
considered to value claims against the estate. Id.
207. Id. The court stated that lelven a disputed claim may have a value," but the
estate cannot base the value only on actuarial tables without taking into account the
fact that the claim is disputed because "a disputed claim is of less value than one
which is uncontested." Id.
208. 7 T.C. 153 (1946), affd without opinion,47-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 10,566 (6th
Cir. 1947), availableat No. 10,382, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3895, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5,
1947).
209. Estate of Metcalf,7 T.C. at 156.
210. Id
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$2,379.54 in taxes and penalties. 21' The estate did not pay any of the
Dyer County taxes, and, at the time of Estate of Metcalf, there was a
suit pending in this matter.212 The estate claimed a deduction of
$17,204.54 for the claims against the estate in Shelby County despite
having actually paid a lesser amount, and deducted the full amount
claimed by the government as taxes in the Dyer County real estate,
21 3
despite not having paid any of it as of the time of Estate of Metcalf.
The court held that post-death events that affect the value of the claim
should be taken into account when valuing the claim against the estate
for estate tax purposes. 14 It reasoned that the estate's deduction for a
claim that they
did not fully pay, and would never fully pay, is
"untenable." ' 5 The court found that deductions can only be taken for
claims that may be enforced against the estate, and since "the unpaid
balance of [the Shelby County tax] no longer represented an
enforceable claim against the decedent's estate" as a result of the
settlement, the estate cannot claim it as a deduction.216 The court
applied the same reasoning to the Dyer County debt.2 17 However,
since the court did not know how the suit regarding that debt would
end up (whether the claim would be paid in full, or whether it would
be settled for a lesser amount), and it did not know whether the estate
was denying all or part of the liability in that suit, the court denied the
entire deduction. 21 8
D. The Debate SurroundingWhether an Enforceable Claim at the Date
of Death Can Be Deducted if Subsequent Events Make the Claim
Unenforceable
1. An Enforceable Claim at the Date of Death Is Deductible Despite
It Subsequently Becoming Unenforceable
The Treasury Regulations state that "[o]nly claims enforceable
against the decedent's estate may be deducted." ' 9 "[L]egislative
history, statutory interpretation, and the better reasoned cases
support a conclusion that the permissibility and the amount of the
deduction for claims against the estate should be deemed fixed
211. Id. at 157.

212. Id.
213. Id. at 160-61.
214. Id. at 161-62.
215. Id. at 160.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 161.
218. Id. at 161-62. The court was not sure what amount, if any, the estate should be
able to deduct for the taxes owed in Dyer County. Because of the speculation that
the court would have to engage in, the court denied the entire deduction. Id. at 162;
see also, Lewis, supra note 27, at 774 ("If liability has not been determined by the time
of the final audit of the return, no deduction will be allowed.").
219. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958); see supra Part I.B.4.
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absolutely at the date of death." 0 Further, estate tax is meant to be a
tax "on the transmission of property by the decedent, not on the
receipt of property by a beneficiary .... [Slince the amount of the net
estate is fixed at death, events subsequent to the date of death are
irrelevant to the calculation."" 1 Thus, if a claim is enforceable at the
time of the decedent's death, and can only become unenforceable
after the decedent's death, the estate should be allowed to deduct the
claim as a valid claim against the estate.
In Russell v. United States,2 the decedent died owing money held in
trust to her children.' Her children filed a claim in the probate court
seeking the money held for them in trust after the statute of
limitations for filing a claim against the estate had run.' The probate
court ordered the estate to pay the claim even though the statute of
limitations had run, and the estate claimed the amount as a §
2053(a)(3) deduction. 5 The court in Russell found that the probate
court's order to pay the claim was void since the statute of limitations
had run out, and the claims against the estate were not enforceable at
the time that they were filed in probate court.

6

The court also found,

however, that whether the claim became unenforceable after the
decedent's death is irrelevant to whether a claim is deductible under §
2053 because claims may be deducted if they are enforceable at the
time of the decedent's death "under the laws of the jurisdiction where
the estate is being administered." '
"That the claims were
subsequently lost by lapse of time is irrelevant."
The court
reasoned that earlier cases which held that post-death events should
be taken into consideration have been overridden by more recent
statutes?229 "IT]he earlier statute used the words 'claims as are
allowed by the jurisdiction.' This language was changed in the 1954
revision to 'claims as are allowable,"'" which allows deductions for
claims that are enforceable at death but later become unenforceable.
In Winer v. United States,2' the estate sought to recover $2,617.81,
which it had paid in estate tax under protest, by claiming that a debt
owed to the decedent's daughter should have been deducted as a

220. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 709; see supra notes 125, 127, 132-35 and
accompanying text. Contra Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272, cited in Palmquist,
supra note 36, at 708-09; see also infra text accompanying note 238.
221. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 710.
222. 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. I1. 1966).
223. Id. at 497.
224. Id. at 498.
225. Id at 498-99.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 499 (quoting Comm'r v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1935)).
228. d

229. Id
230. Id; see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
231. 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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The decedent's daughter, however, did not

file a claim for the debt with the probate court within the required
statute of limitations period after the decedent had died.

3

The

Commissioner argued that since the claim was never filed, it cannot be
deducted as a claim against the estate.
The court held that postdeath events do not matter.235 The court pointed out that although
Treasury Regulations say that only claims "enforceable" may be
deducted, "[ilt is worth noting that the aforesaid regulation ... does
not say 'Only claims enforced against the decedent's estate' are
subject to deduction. ' '126 Because the creditor had an enforceable
claim at the time of the decedent's death, the estate should be able to
deduct the claim."

2. A Claim Enforceable at the Date of Death That Subsequently
Becomes Unenforceable Cannot Be Deducted
Revenue Ruling 60-247 provides:
A deduction, for Federal estate tax purposes, will not be allowed for
claims against the estate which have not been paid or will not be
paid because the creditor waives payment, fails to file his claim
within the time limit and under the conditions prescribed by
applicable local law, or otherwise fails to enforce paymentP

While the legal force of this Revenue Ruling has been questioned, 2 9
the Internal Revenue

Service

considers

post-death events

to

determine
both the value and permissibility of a deduction for the
40
claim.

2

Some tax court decisions have found that post-death events can be
considered in valuing a claim against the estate. 4 ' In Jacobs v.
Commissioner,42 the decedent's estate filed a tax return deducting
back taxes that it owed to Stark County, Ohio.2 43 However, the
232. Id. at 942.
233. Id.; see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
234. Winer, 153 F. Supp. at 942.
235. Id. at 943.
236. Id. The court found that "[d]eductibility is not conditioned on a claim's
allowance by a local court, but rather upon its enforceability under local law." Id.
(citing Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 42-43.
237. Winer, 153 F. Supp. at 944.
238. Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272, quoted in Palmquist, supra note 36, at 708.
239. In Russell v. United States the court ruled that Revenue Ruling 60-247 is
invalid. 260 F. Supp. 493, 499-500 (N.D. I1l. 1966). It held that the ruling "is not
controlling because of applicable case law. A revenue ruling which runs counter to
the provisions of a statute is a legal nullity." Id. at 500; see also Palmquist, supra note
36, at 713 (discussing the Russell decision).
240. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 709.
241. But see supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
242. 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936).
243. Id. at 595-96.
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county issued a certificate of immunity from back taxes after the
decedent's death as an incentive to get taxpayers to declare the
property they owned. 2' The estate notified the county that they
would make use of the certificate of immunity and would not be
paying the estate tax.245 The Tax Court held that the deduction
claimed at the date of death was invalid, stating that "[t]he purpose of
the revenue act in allowing deductions is to see that the tax is imposed
on the net estate, which is really what of value passes from the dead to
the living. ' 246 The court argued that Congress, when it created a
deduction for claims against the estate, meant for it to cover only
claims that were valid and actually paid or will be paid.247
The Tax Court in Estate of Nesselrodt v. Commissioner248 also
addressed the issue of unenforced claims. In Estate of Nesselrodt, the
decedent and his wife divorced, and the decedent, according to the
divorce agreement, was required to pay his wife $80,547.01.249 At the
date of his death, he owed $54,000, which was to be paid in nine
annual installments of $6000 each, but the estate paid the claim in full
and deducted it from the estate tax return.2 10 There was another
deduction for a debt due to a company, but the company never filed a
claim to be paid by the estate, and the estate never paid the claim. 1
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency claiming that the
estate owed more taxes because the balance due to the wife should
have been $38,146.80, the present value of the nine remaining
The Commissioner also disallowed the entire
installments. 2
deduction for the balance due to the company because it had not been
paid. 253 The Tax Court held that the estate was allowed to pay a lump
sum for the claim owed to the wife, but the amount of the deduction
allowed under § 2053 is limited to the present value of the claim,
which was smaller in amount.2 14 The court also disallowed the
deduction for the claim the company had against the estate because

244. Id. at 596.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 597.

247. Id. Using similar reasoning to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Jacobs v.
Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1929), the court reasoned that "tax laws are
interested in practical results and deal with substance." Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. at 597.
Since the estate will never pay the claim, it cannot be deducted. Id.; see supra text
accompanying note 147.
248. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1406 (1986).
249. Id. at 1407.
250. Id.

251. Id.
252. Id. at 1408; see supra text accompanying note 60.
253. Estate of Nesselrodt,51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1408.

254. Id. at 1410. The probate court allowed the estate to pay the greater lump sum
to the wife (without having valued the claim at its present value), but the Tax Court
held that the probate court's ruling does not mean that the greater sum is deductible
under § 2053. Id. at 1409-10,
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the creditor never filed the claim in probate court5 5 The court
reasoned that because the creditor never filed the claim with probate
court, the claim was no longer legally enforceable against the estate
under state law, and thus, there was no allowable deduction under §
2053(a)(3). 6
E. The DebateSurroundingIf and How to Deduct Contingent Claims
Against the Estate
1. Contingent Claims Should Be Claimed As a Deduction Based on
Facts Existing at the Time of Death
The debate regarding contingent claims is whether only facts known
up to the date of death should be considered in determining whether
the estate will be liable in the future,27 and therefore, entitled to a
deduction for those claims, or whether any event that occurs in the
future, however unforeseegle, should be included in the analysis.
For a contingent claim, the estate has a legal obligation existing at
the time of death, but it may never actually have to pay the debt.25s
Deductions under a date-of-death valuation analysis, it can be argued,
should be based on the amount of the claim determined at the date of
death and the likelihood at the date of death that the estate will have
to pay that claim?5 9 If it appears at the date of the decedent's death
that the party primarily liable for the debt will pay it, then the estate
should not be permitted to deduct the contingent claim as a claim
against the estate.26
This argument can be based on how contingent claims, where the
decedent is the creditor,are valued for purposes of determining the
assets of the estate.261 Any claim that a decedent owns as a creditor is
considered a part of the decedent's assets for purposes of determining
the value of the taxable estate. All of the assets of the estate are
valued as of the date of the decedent's death, and events that later
255. Id. at 1410. "Where no claim for a debt due from the decedent is filed in the

probate proceeding prior to the date upon which the claim becomes barred under
State law, then generally no deduction for the claim is allowable to the estate." Id.
256. Id.

257. This is analogous to Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515, 520 (5th
Cir. 1999), where the estate disputed the claim and it was possible at the date of death
that the estate would not have to pay the claim. See also supra notes 185-92 and
accompanying text.
258. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 708; see supra Part I.B.5.
259. This theoretical argument has not been made by any court. Except for the
Ninth Circuit, circuits that have subscribed to the date-of-death valuation method for
other types of claims against the estate have not addressed whether the same method
would apply to contingent claims against the estate. See supra Part I.B; infra note 267.
260. Palmquist, supra note 36, at 708, 717.

261. See Estate of Curry v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 540 (1980); see also supra notes 94-102
and accompanying text.

2002]

THE LR.C. §2053(a)(3) CONTROVERSY

2733

change the value of those assets are irrelevant.2Y Even when the
value of an asset is contingent upon a future event, only factors known
up to, but not after, the date of the decedent's death may be
considered for purposes of valuing that asset .263 Therefore, when a
decedent is a creditor on a contingent claim, as was the case in Estate
of Curry v. Commissioner,264 that claim must be valued at the date of
the decedent's death. By analogy, then, if the decedent is the debtor
on a contingent claim, that claim also must be valued at the date of the
decedent's death.'
2. Only If Subsequent Events Make the Estate Pay for the Contingent
Claim Should the Claim Be Deducted
Treasury Regulations provide:
If the amount of a liability was not ascertainable at the time of final
audit of the return ...and, as a consequence, it was not allowed as a

deduction in the audit, and subsequently the amount of the liability
is ascertained, relief may be sought by a petition to the Tax Court or
a claim for refund as provided by sections 6213(a) and 6511,
respectively.'
This suggests that post-death events must necessarily be taken into
account when determining whether to deduct for a contingent claim
against the estate because it is not clearly ascertainable at the date of
death whether the estate wiU ever have to pay the claim.
In a contingent claim case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that post-death
events should be taken into account when valuing claims against the
estate. 7 In Du Val's Estate v. Commissioner,21 the decedent
guaranteed a loan made to a company, and, at the time of decedent's
death, the unpaid balance was $175,000.69 The company was fully
solvent and able to pay the loan at the time of the decedent's death
and continued to be financially strong when the Tax Court heard the
262. See supra Part I.D.
263. See supra Part I.D.
264. 74 T.C. 540 (1980).
265. See infra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
266. Treas. Reg § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see supra text
accompanying notes 42-43; supra Part I.B.5.
267. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit in Propstra v. United States ruled that claims
that are certain and enforceable at the date of the decedent's death should be valued
at the date of death. 680 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982). Propstra distinguished
contingent claims stating that "[tihe law is clear that post-death events are relevant
when computing the deduction to be taken for disputed or contingent claims." Id. at
1253. This suggests that contingent claims should be treated differently than other
types of claims, where contingent claims nust be valued by taking into account postdeath events. The law, however, is not as "clear" as Propstrasuggests. See supra Part
II.C.1. For an explanation of the different types of claims against the estate, see supra
Part I.B.
268. 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945).
269. Id at 103-04.
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case. 7 0 In addition, there was a co-guarantor for the loan, who was
also liable if the decedent could not pay the loan, 7 ' further insulating
the estate from the prospect of incurring any real liability in the future
and from the risk of having to pay the claim. The court denied any
deduction for the estate, concluding that allowing this deduction for a
claim against the estate would "lead to absurd ends." 272
As this part of this Note shows, there is controversy over when to
value claims against the estate for estate tax purposes. It is possible to
value claims either at the date of the decedent's death or at some later
point. Absent a clear statute, regulation, or Supreme Court ruling on
this matter, the date of valuation will remain unclear.
III. RESOLUTION: CLAIMS SHOULD BE VALUED AT THE DATE OF
THE DECEDENT'S DEATH

This part argues that a claim should always be valued at the date of
death based on what the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury
Regulations, and case law has stated. Section A points out that the
reasoning of Jacobs v. Commissioner, the seminal case that argues for
post-death valuation of claims, is fundamentally suspect and should
not be followed.273 Section B discusses why all types of claims against
the estate should be valued at the date of the decedent's death. 74 As
the strongest arguments for considering post-death events arguably
arise in the context of disputed or difficult to determine claims and
contingent claims, Sections B.1 and B.2 will give special consideration
to those situations.275
A. DeconstructingJacobs v. Commissioner
2 76 is the leading case supporting the
Jacobs v. Commissioner
position that post-death events should be considered when valuing a
claim against the estate. Cases that subscribe to the date-of-death
valuation method have pointed to Jacobs as the preeminent case
arguing for a post-death analysis of claims against the estate.27 7

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 292-343 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 316-43 and accompanying text.
34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929).

277. See, e.g., Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating that circuits either follow the date-of-death approach of Ithaca Trust
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), or the post-death valuation of Jacobs v.
Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929)); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248,
1256 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Jacobs has spawned a line of authority supporting the
proposition that post-death events must be taken into account when computing the
value of certain and enforceable claims against the estate.").
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Jacobs, however, was decided in 1929,271 and recent cases have not
subscribed to the Jacobs "actuality" approach. - 9 The interpretation
of more recent cases and the Treasury Regulations show that Jacobs
was wrongly decided and that post-death events should not be
considered.
In Jacobs, the decedent owed his wife a lump sum payment of
$75,000 per a contractual agreement.'
In his will, however, the
decedent left his wife installment payments of $250,000 if she did not
pursue the $75,000 claim against the estate."' At the time of his
death, then, the decedent owed a debt of $75,000. His wife, however,
decided to accept the terms of the will and did not take the $75,000
owed to her.'
The Eighth Circuit found that post-death events
should be taken into account and preferred an "actuality" approach, "
rather than the approach taken by Ithaca Trust Co. v. United Statesl
and the other circuits in favor of valuing claims against the estate at
the date of the decedent's death.2' The Eighth Circuit stated that
there is neither a claimant nor a claim in this case, so the estate cannot
make any deduction for the $75,000. "-

Although the Eighth Circuit properly recognized that the estate
would be getting a windfall by claiming a deduction on $75,000 that it
had no intention of paying out as a liability, the court misinterpreted
the antenuptial agreement. The wife in Jacobs had a valid claim of
$75,000 and was a valid claimant at the time of the decedent's death'
The decedent put the provision of paying $250,000 in installments to
his wife precisely because she had that valid claim. In other words, if
the decedent's wife did not have a valid lump sum claim of $75,000
against the decedent, he would not have put a provision in his will
giving her the option to receive the $250,000 in installments. Thus, the
wife's claim was ascertainable and certain at the decedent's death.
The Eighth Circuit failed to distinguish the date-of-death value from
post-death events caused by the wife (creditor). That the wife
declined the claim after the decedent died does not change the fact
that at the date of death the wife had a valid claim against the estate
that she could recover. According to the Treasury Regulations, such a
claim may be deducted because it represents "personal obligations of
278. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 233.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8; supra note 147-57 and accompanying
text. The Eighth Circuit, however, has left Jacobs intact, finding that post-death
events should be considered in valuing claims against the estate. Estate of Sachs v.
Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158,1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
280. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 233; see also supra text accompanying note 144.
281. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 233; see also supra text accompanying note 145.
282. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 233; see also supra text accompanying note 146.
283. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 235; see supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
284. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
286. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 236.
287. Id at 236-37 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
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the decedent existing at the time of his death. '288 Therefore, at the
time of the decedent's death, the decedent had a personal obligation
to his wife in the amount of $75,000 that should have been deducted
as a claim against the estate.289 The value of the claim as of the date of
death should stand.
Although Jacobs is the leading case for arguing that post-death
events should be taken into consideration, it is a weak case on its facts.
In Jacobs,the will created a situation where the estate did not know at
the time of the decedent's death whether or not the estate would ever
have to pay the $75,000 claim. Although the wife did have a valid
claim against the estate at the time of the decedent's death, it is also
possible at the time of the decedent's death that the claim would not
be paid. If Jacobs has any force, it is as a contingent claim,290 but as
this Note will argue, even contingent claims should be valued at the
date of death.291
B. Post-DeathEvents Should Not Be Consideredin Determiningthe
Value of Claims Against the Estate
An estate is settled as of the date of death. 2 The estate's assets are
valued as of the date of the decedent's death, and subsequent events
that affect the value of those assets are not considered for estate tax
purposes.293 Valuation of claims, therefore, which affect the value of
the estate just as much as assets, should also be settled as of the date
of death, regardless of the type of claim (e.g., an enforceable claim at
death should be deductible as a claim against the estate regardless of
whether subsequent events make the claim unenforceable). It would
be anomalous to value the assets of an estate at one time but the
claims against the estate at another time. Since the valuation of both
assets and claims is critical to see what property transfers at death for
estate tax purposes,2 94 it does not make sense to have different
valuation dates for each. It would leave the estate confused as to how
to manage and disperse the estate. 95
Even if one disregarded the comparison between assets and claims,
the date-of-death valuation of claims is still most consistent with the
intent of the estate tax laws. Section 2001 of the Internal Revenue
288. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958); see also supra text accompanying note 25.
289. This is analogous to an enforceable claim at death that later becomes
unenforceable due to the creditor's action or lack of action. See supra Parts I.B.4,
II.D.
290. See supra note 143.
291. See infra Part III.B.2.
292. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2033-1 (as amended in 1963), 20.2053-4 (1958); Propstra
v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Lester v. Comm'r, 57
T.C. 503, 507 (1972); supra text accompanying notes 135, 170.
293. See supra Part I.D.
294. See I.R.C. § 2033 (2001); supra note 93.
295. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

2002]

THE LR.C. §2053(a)(3) CONTROVERSY

2737

Code states that a tax is "imposed on the transfer of the taxable
'
estate."296
This transfer occurs at the date of the decedent's death.

"[T]he estate tax is a tax on the privilege of transfering [sic] property
upon one's death, [so] the property to be valued for estate tax
purposes is that which the decedent actually transfers at his
death. .".."297 Since the tax is imposed on the transfer of the estate,
which occurs at death, the valuation of the estate, including its claims,
should be valued at the date of death.
Of course, there have been arguments that the purpose of estate tax
is to tax the interest that the beneficiaries receive (which occurs after
the date of the decedent's death),29 rather than a tax on the transfer
of the estate (which happens at the date of death). Such a tax would
allow post-death events to be considered when valuing claims against
the estate. This view, however, appears suspect based on the plain
language of § 2001, which clearly states that estate tax is a tax on the
"transfer" of the estate.' 9 Although the Internal Revenue Code does
make reference to a tax being imposed on the transfer of an estate, it
does not make any mention of a tax being imposed on the estate that
the beneficiaries receive.
Further, those circuits that have recently examined when to value a
claim against the estate as a case of first impression have subscribed to
this rule of transfer and found that claims against the estate should be
valued at the date of death, making it questionable that the estate tax
is intended to be a tax on the property that the beneficiaries receive.3 O
This may be because of the change in the law that occurred in 1954.311
The predecessor to § 2053(a) stated that the "'net estate shall be
determined... by deducting from the value of the gross estate...
claims against the estate. ' ' '30 It can be argued that § 812, the
predecessor of § 2053(a), was meant to tax the property that the
beneficiaries receive because the statute spoke of the "net estate,"
which is in effect what passes to the beneficiaries. Section 2053, on
the other hand, does not refer to the "net estate."' 3 This change in
language may account for the more recent cases finding that the intent
of § 2053(a)(3) was to value claims against the estate at the date of
death, which is when the transfer of the estate happens, rather than at
296. I.R.C. § 2001(a).
297. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1250 (emphasis added); see also supra note 135 and
accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 337-39.
298. Hagmann Comment, supra note 27, at 637; see also supra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text.
299. I.R.C. § 2001(a); see also supra text accompanying note 296.
300. Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Estate of
O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); see also supra text
accompanying note 152; supra notes 136-41, 193-96 and accompanying text.
301. See supra text accompanying note 41.
302. Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372,374 (2d Cir. 1960) (quoting I.RC. §
812 (1939)); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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some later date. 3" The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of estate tax
being a tax "on the act of transferring property... [which happens at]
the instant of death,"3 5 is more similar in language and reasoning to
the Internal Revenue Code and should be followed.
Changing the value of a claim against the estate also seems contrary
to regulations. The interest on claims against the estate can only be
valued for a deduction in the amount accrued up to the date of death
but not beyond.3" Any subsequent interest, which could increase the
value of the claim after the date of death, may not be deducted. If
interest can only be considered up to the date of death, why should
other post-death events that change the value of claims against the
estate be taken into consideration? It seems that to allow a postdeath settlement, but not to allow post-death interest, to affect the
value of an estate would be contradictory policy.
Further, the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations state
that deductions may be taken for a claim representing personal
obligations of the decedent "existing at the time of death."3" The
regulations do not say that should the amount of the personal
obligation change, or should the personal obligation become invalid at
some later event (as in the case of enforceable claims that later
become unenforceable), the deduction should similarly change. The
statutes and regulations only speak of deductions being taken for
claims that are valid at the date of death.
There have been arguments, however, that because § 2053(a)
includes deductions for funeral and administration expenses, which
must be valued after the date of death, Congress intended the
valuation of claims against the estate to also take into consideration
post-death events.30 ' Such an argument, however, is disputable. The
Eighth Circuit stated that deductions for claims against the estate
were included in the same statutory section as deductions for funeral
expenses and administration expenses, both of which are valued after
304. Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, which was decided in 1960, for example,
held that post-death events should be taken into consideration when valuing claims
against the estate. 276 F.2d at 375. This case, however, relied heavily on § 812, the
predecessor to § 2053(a). Given the change in the language of the statute, the case
may have been decided differently today.
305. Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra
text accompanying note 191.
306. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
307. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (emphasis added); see I.R.C. § 2053(c)(2) (2001); see
supra text accompanying note 42. This obligation must be enforceable at the time of
death, not actually enforced at some later time, to be deductible. Treas. Reg. §
20.2053-4; Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also
supra text accompanying notes 43, 236. The fact that the debt is extinguished in part
or in its entirety after the decedent has died is of no consequence to the enforceability
of the claim that existed at the date of the decedent's death. The deduction, then,
should be for the amount that the claim is worth at the date of death.
308. Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1929); Federal Estate Tax, supra
note 157, at 478; see also supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
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the date of death. 0 9 This means, the Eighth Circuit reasoned, that
claims against the estate must have also been intended by Congress to
be valued by post-death events. 10 The Eighth Circuit's analysis,
however, is a bit of a stretch. Funeral and administrative expenses
necessarily have to be valued after the date of death because that is
when those expenses arise. It is impossible to value those deductions
until the decedent has died. In the case of claims against the estate,
however, a claim needs to be valid "at the time of [the decedent's]
death" to be deductible.31 1 It is perfectly reasonable to require postdeath analysis for funeral and administration expenses and not for
claims against the estate. Furthermore, in most cases, a claim against
the estate has value and can be valued as of the date of death,312 unlike
funeral and administrative expenses. A claim against the estate, then,
is different in form from funeral and administrative expenses, which
makes the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Congressional intent
questionable.313
Finally, it is worth noting that the Internal Revenue Service has not
been consistent in its position that post-death events should be taken
into account when valuing claims against the estate.1 When it can
generate more revenue (i.e., when the value of a deductible claim is
worth more at death than at a later point), the Internal Revenue
Service has argued that the claim should be valued based on events up
to, but not after, the date of the decedent's death.315 Putting in place a
date-of-death valuation of claims against the estate would make the
rule uniform and consistent, and would not allow the Commissioner to
apply the post-death valuation in some instances but not others. This
would lead to predictability and certainty for estate administration.

309. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 236; see I.R.C. § 2053(a).
310. Jacobs,34 F.2d at 236; see supra text accompanying note 150.
311. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4. Courts have also found that the date-of-death
valuation is the rule and that the exceptions to that rule are when to value funeral
expenses and when to value administration expenses (and not that all three should
take into consideration post-death events by virtue of the three deductions having
been grouped into one statute). Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 524 n.36
(5th Cir. 1999); supra note 192.
312. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929); supra text
accompanying note 170; see supra text accompanying notes 128-29, 136-38, 143-44,
158-61, 200-02, 208-09, 231-32, 242-43, 248-50; supra note 176; supra Part I.B.1-2, 4.
But see Jones, supra note 65, at 671. "There are some types of claims whose effect
upon the 'taxable estate' must be determined by subsequent events." Id.
313. One court held that it is "insignificant that Congress placed funeral and estate
administration expenses, which are calculated after death, with claims against the
estate in section 2053(a), because that section also contains a deduction for unpaid
mortgages, which may be calculated without reference to post-death events." Estate
of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001).
314. See, e.g., Estate of Lester v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 503, 507 (1972); see also supra
note 166.
315. See, e.g., Estate of Lester, 57 T.C. at 507 (1972); Palmquist, supra note 36, at
711.
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1. Claims That Are Disputed or Difficult to Ascertain
Like certain claims whose amounts are definite at the date of
death,3 16 disputed claims have value at the date of death.317 The
precise value may be subject to debate because it is a disputed claim,
but it nonetheless has some value as of the date of death.318 In Estate
3 9 an estate settled a disputed claim fifteen
of Smith v. Commissioner,
months after the decedent's death.32 The Commissioner argued that
because the claim was disputed at the date of death, the claim's value
should not have been determined at the date of death; instead, a
deduction should only be taken for the amount that the estate actually
paid.32 1 The Fifth Circuit ruled that even disputed claims must be
valued at the date of death.3 22 The Fifth Circuit's approach-that
disputed claims are to be valued based on facts known up to, but not
after, the date of death-is most consistent with the regulations,3 23 and
should be adopted.
Section 20.2053-1(b)(3) denies deductions for "vague or uncertain"
estimates but allows deductions for claims valued with "reasonable
certainty."324 This would allow disputed claims to be valued at the
date of death provided that sufficient facts support the certainty of
that value. Even claims whose value is difficult to ascertain at the
date of death nevertheless have some value that is deductible up front.
An exact figure is not required by the regulations, which state that
"[a]n item may be entered on the return for a deduction though its
exact amount is not then known. '325 Therefore, these types of claims
can be valued at the date of death provided that the valuation is based
on circumstances that foster "reasonable certainty." For example, an
executor of an estate can research the value of claims in the estate's
jurisdiction existing at the time of the decedent's death that are similar
to the disputed or difficult to ascertain claims and deduct that amount.
Further, an analogy can legitimately be made between an estate's
assets and claims. Even when an estate has assets whose values are
either difficult to ascertain, disputed, or contingent, those assets are
nevertheless valued at the date of death.3 26 Post-death events that
change the value or allow a determination of value with greater

316. See supra Part I.B.1.
317. See supra note 207.
318. Gowetz v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 874, 876 (1st Cir. 1963); supra note 207.
319. 198 F.3d 515 (5th CiT. 1999).
320. Id. at 519-20; see also supra text accompanying note 186.
321. Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 520; see also supra text accompanying note 187.
322. Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 517; see also supra text accompanying note 188.
323. Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 517; supra text accompanying note 188; see Treas.
Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972).
324. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3).
325. Id.
326. See supra Part I.D.
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certainty are not considered.3 27 Similarly, if a decedent is a creditor at
the time of his death, the amount of the debt owed to him is valued at
the date of death, and anything that compromises the value of that
liability after the decedent's death is not considered. 2 8 It should
follow, then, that where the decedent is the debtor on a claim, that
claim should also be valued at the date of the decedent's death. This
would provide both finality and consistency to the way an estate is
settled.
Since the regulations do not bar disputed claims, or claims difficult
to ascertain, from being deductible, such claims should be permitted
as deductions and valued with "reasonable certainty" at the date of
death in the same manner as assets are valued.
2. Contingent Claims
Contingent claims differ from other types of claims because in these
types of claims an estate is liable for a debt based on the action or
inaction of another. Usually, this action occurs after the decedent has
died.3 29 There are instances, however, where it appears likely at the
date of the decedent's death that the estate will have to pay that debt
on behalf of the primary obligator,3 3 ° and the value of that debt can be
ascertained at the date of the decedent's death based on facts known
up to that point. In such instances, the claim should be deductible as a
claim1 against the estate in the same way that a disputed claim would
be.

33

The regulations do not require absolutes, but only "reasonable
certainty.

'332

A contingent claim, therefore, should be deducted,

when, at the time of death, it appears with "reasonable certainty" that
the estate will have to pay the claim.333

327. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033
(2001) (emphasis added). Treasury Regulations also state that "[t]he value of every
item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate.., is its fair market value at
the time of the decedent's death." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965)
(emphasis added); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 90. Consider the hypothetical: Jimmy Jones dies leaving an
estate worth $3,000,000, but is also a creditor on a disputed claim against a third party
in the amount of $200,000. At the time of his death, the $200,000 is included in the
decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes. One year after the estate pays
its taxes, the estate settles the claim owed by the third party for $100,000. Under the
Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations, the settlement is of no
consequence. The settlement was a post-death event, and the estate cannot file an
amended return to pay the reduced taxes on the actual value of the estate.
329. Jones, supra note 65, at 671-73; see supra note 312 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part II.B.1.
332. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972).
333. Id. If, however, the value cannot be determined with "reasonable certainty"
at the date of death, the estate can try to ascertain the value up to the time of final
audit and deduct it then. Id. If, even at the time of the final audit the estate cannot
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A contingent claim is analogous to a disputed claim in that at the
date of death a liability exists, but there is a possibility that the estate
will not pay it.334 Similarly, a contingent claim can be analogous to a
claim whose value is difficult to ascertain.335 For disputed claims and
claims whose value is difficult to ascertain, there is controversy on
whether to value the claims based on facts known up to the date of
death, or whether the deduction should be limited to the amount that
is actually proved or agreed on by the estate after the decedent has
died.336 Courts have ruled that disputed claims and claims whose
value is difficult to ascertain should be valued at the date of death,
and the deduction taken should reflect that value. 7 There is no
reason why the same rule cannot apply to contingent claims. If
disputed claims, which may never have to be paid by the estate, can be
deducted based on their value at the time of the decedent's death,
contingent claims, which similarly may not be paid, should be
deducted in the same manner. In both cases, the value of the claim
may be determined with "reasonable certainty," and the estate may
arguably prove that the claim will be paid338 based on facts that exist
up to the date of the decedent's death.33 9
Contingent claims should be treated in the same way as disputed
claims because they involve many of the same issues (whether the
claim will be paid, for example). Further, such a rule coincides with
the policy of settling the estate at the date of death, as courts have
stated that the estate tax is a tax "on the act of transferring
property... [which happens at] the instant of death."34 °
A contingent claim could likewise be treated like a contingent asset,
where the value of the asset is always determined at the date of death,
discounted for any uncertainties that are present at the point of
death.341 If a contingent asset must be valued at the date of the
decedent's death, a contingent claim should be valued at that same
date. 342 The nature of a contingent asset is often one where the
ascertain the liability or value of the claim, it may petition the Tax Court or claim a
refund within the required statute of limitations period upon later ascertaining the
value of the liability. Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 6511 (2001).
334. See supra text accompanying note 66.
335. See supra text accompanying note 65.
336. See supra text accompanying note 67; supra Part II.C.
337. Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Estate of
Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part II.C.1.
338. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see supra text
accompanying note 182.
339. See Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 517; see also supra text accompanying note
188. The courts have never tested this argument formally, but it should be
considered, given the history and recent trends of the date-of-death valuation
arguments that have prevailed for other claims. See supra notes 297-305 and
accompanying text.
340. Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 524; see also supra text accompanying note 323.
341. See supra Part I.D.
342. In an arguably contradictory policy, the Commissioner has argued that a
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decedent is a creditor on a claim. 3 If such contingent claims on which
the decedent is a creditor are valued at the date of death, there is no
reason why the same should not be true for a contingent claim on
which the decedent is a debtor. There can be no sound policy reason
for treating the same type of claims differently solely based on
whether the decedent was a creditor or a debtor; the underlying facts
that would be relevant as to whether liability would arise in both cases
are still the same.
CONCLUSION

Up to now there has been confusion on when to value a claim
against the estate. Courts have remained divided between valuing a
claim at the date of the decedent's death and considering post-death
events that change the value of the claim. Although there is no clear
rule on when to value a claim against an estate, the Internal Revenue
Code, Treasury Regulations, and adequate case law seem to favor
valuation at the date of death. Such a valuation would resolve the
current confusion on when to value a claim by providing a "bright line
rule." ' At the same time, the date-of-death valuation requires the
entire estate, assets and claims alike, to be settled at the date of the
decedent's death. There will rarely be an instance where a claim
cannot be valued at the date of death, and, even in such instances, the
regulations provide us with some guidance." Allowing for post-death
events to be taken into consideration when valuing claims against the
estate can lead to a lot of uncertainty about when the estate will
finally be settled. 6 Even if there is a "statute-of-limitations" period
during which claims may be valued up to a certain point after death,
there will still arise the danger of the estate purposefully settling a
claim just beyond that period to avoid higher estate tax duties. A
contingent asset has value at the date of death that can be added to the gross estate for
purposes of calculating the estate tax, but when an estate attempts to deduct a
contingent claim, the Commissioner has argued that the contingent nature of these
claims should preclude a § 2053 deduction. See Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 527
(discussing the Commissioner's argument that contingent assets should be included in
the decedent's gross estate); Gowetz v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 874, 876 (1st Cir. 1963)
(discussing the Commissioner's argument that contingent claims are different and
should not be deducted from the decedent's gross estate); see also supra notes 103-06
and accompanying text; supra note 205.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 261-65; supra Part I.D.
344. Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001); see supra
text accompanying note 141.
345. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see also supra note 333
and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 180; supra text accompanying note 295. Consider what would
happen in a situation like Ithaca Trust Co. v.United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), where
the actuarial tables predicting the life expectancy of the relevant party were wrong,
but instead of six months, it took forty years to find out. See supra text accompanying
notes 110-15.
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person's life is finalized at death. A person's estate should likewise be
finalized on that date.

